We analyze the effect of Toyota's faulty accelerator pedal on stockholder wealth. Using the event study methodology, we show that a major recall in January of 2010 caused the company's cumulative abnormal returns to fall by 19%. Continued concerns that Toyota was unable to identify and adequately fix the problem induced the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to conduct its own investigation in March, 2010. The results of this government investigation exonerated the company and caused Toyota's cumulative abnormal returns to rise by almost 9%. The Toyota case provides an opportunity to study a product recall with both company error and a government action that addressed concerns about the safety of the product.
I. Introduction
There is a saying in business that if a company loses its resources but retains its reputation, it can rebuild, but money cannot bring back a company that loses its reputation. To build consumer loyalty, a company must offer reliable products at a reasonable price. The process of building a reputation for reliability and value can take decades, and a major misstep can tarnish a company's reputation for many years. Product recalls are potential reputation harming events.
Large cross-sectional studies on product recalls (for example see Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam 2013) suggest that firms experience significant declines in sales, often increase advertising to counter the lost reputation, and can use their brand loyalty to offset some of the adverse consequences. But the problem with large cross-sectional studies is that the number of incidents is so high that the market may be insensitive to many of these frequent events. In fact, the market may believe it is just part of the normal business cycle. The sample used by Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam had 816 events over a five year period, or approximately one recall every two and a half days. Others have elected to review a specific industry for more insight. The auto industry recalls have been examined by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) , Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1988) , and Barber and Darrough (1996) . The drug industry recalls by Amned, Gardella, and Nonda (2002) . The food industry recalls by Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) . All find that, in general, recall events are value destroying events. But clearly, with an event every two days or so, not all recalls are value destroying events. What does it take for a recall to rise to the level that it harms the firm?
When looking at a firm specific case, an individual recall might not have a negative impact on the company or one that is short-lived. A classic example is Johnson and Johnson's recall of its non-aspirin pain reliever, Tylenol (Dowdell, Govindaraj, and Jain (1992) and Mitchell, (1989) ). During a three day period beginning September 29, 1982 , seven Chicago area residents died from taking Extra-Strength Tylenol capsules that had been laced with cyanide.
This caused the market share of all Tylenol brands to immediately fall from 37 to 7 percent.
What is interesting is that this event had little long-term effect on Tylenol's reputation and on stockholder wealth. One reason for this is that cyanide was added to the capsules at retail outlets, not at Tylenol production facilities. Thus, the poisoning was an exogenous event that was not the fault of Johnson and Johnson. Another reason is that the company's response to the poisonings quickly renewed consumer confidence in the Tylenol brand. Once the source of the poison became apparent, Johnson and Johnson immediately withdrew all Tylenol capsules from the market. In addition, the company repackaged Tylenol capsules with a triple safety seal, a first in the industry. As a result, Tylenol's market share reached 30 percent within six months, and the brand returned to its dominant position by August of 1983.
In this paper, we investigate the financial effect of a major product recall on the stock returns of the Toyota Motor Corporation. We select this case because unlike the Tylenol case with Johnson and Johnson, the recall was based on internal issues with manufacturing and not external issues outside the control of the company. From January 2000 to January 2010, there were reports of 52 deaths linked to Toyota vehicles with uncontrolled acceleration (Manning and Raum, 2010) . This led to recalls in 2007 and in 2010 involving approximately 7.5 million Toyota vehicles. At first, there was uncertainty regarding the cause of the problem.
Toyota initially announced that the defect was minor in nature, but engineers at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration were concerned that the problem was due to a major design flaw. It was not until early 2011 that a 10-month government study concluded that Toyota had appropriately corrected the defect. Thus, the Toyota case provides an opportunity to study the effect of four distinct events around the product recall. The initial event is an announced investigation by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) following consumer complaints. The second event is a news event surrounding a highway fatality linked to the acceleration problem. A third event is the company announcement of a design flaw in the accelerator. The fourth event is study released by NHTSA completed by NASA engineers that absolved Toyota. By studying these four incidents in a case study format we can provide additional insight into when a recall incident may have a negative, long lasting impact and when a recall incident may have no impact. . Our goal in this paper is to use a case study of Toyota and the event study method to estimate the impact on Toyota's stock returns of the events related to Toyota's accelerator pedal problems. We want to see if these four events have an impact given the high brand loyalty for Toyota, source of the information (public or company release) and if a good outcome (NHTSA report) after the fact, can reverse the original negative impact. Our results indicate that all events are not the same and products recalls may require special circumstances to elicit a negative reaction by the market. Section II discusses the timeline of events. Section III discusses the event study method. Section IV describes the data and empirical results. Section V provides concluding remarks.
II. Toyota and the Accelerator Pedal Recall
In the first decade of the 21 st century, Toyota had grown to be a very successful corporation. It became the world's largest car manufacturer, replacing General Motors. From (2007 Camry, 2005 Avalon, 2004 -2009 Prius, 2005 Tacoma, 2007 Tundra, 2007 Lexus ES350, and 2006 and Lexus IS350) to remove and not replace their floor mats not replace them until Toyota found a solution. The investigation continued, however, as concerns were raised that unsecure floor mats were not the sole cause of the accelerator problem.
On January 21, 2010, Toyota instituted a major recall, admitting that the problem was also caused by an accelerator pedal design flaw. As Akio Toyoda, CEO of Toyota, admitted, Toyota has, for the past few years, been expanding its business rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick…. We pursued growth over the speed at which we were able to develop our people and our organization…. I regret that this has resulted in safety issues described in the recalls we face today. 
III. Event Study Analysis
We use the event study method to appraise the effect of each event on Toyota's stock returns. This methodology was developed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) . For more recent reviews of this method, see Thomson (1985) , Armitage (1995) , MacKinlay (1997), Romano (2002a, 2002b) and Corrado (2011) . This method has been widely used to study product recalls. Examples include Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) , Hoffer et al. (1988) , Mitchell (1989) , Davidson and Worrell (1992) and Govindraj et al. (2004) . It is based on the market model, which assumes the price of a stock reflects all currently available information in the marketplace (x t ). In particular, the return of a security, such as stock i at time t (R it ), is a function of all available market information, which is typically measured as the market return on a large portfolio of stocks (R mt ). 6 The market model assumes a stable linear relationship:
where the error term depends on unanticipated random events and is, purely white noise.
Our goal is to test the null hypothesis that an event such as a product recall has no effect on a company's abnormal returns. An abnormal return is defined as the actual ex post return minus the expected return. The normal return equals the expected return, conditional on the event never taking place. Formally, the abnormal return for firm i at event date τ is
where E(R iτ |R mτ ) is the expected normal return and R mτ is the pre-event conditioning information for the normal return model. In other words, R mτ is the information that is used to forecast the expected return assuming that the event had never occurred. 6 In applications, the Standard & Poor 500 Index (S&P Index) is used for the market portfolio.
To successfully measure and analyze abnormal returns, we first need sufficient stock price (and dividend) data before and after the event date. Let τ = 0 be the event date and W pre be the pre-event time period or estimation window. 7 Let T pre be the number of observations (days) in W pre . The event window (W event ) identifies the time it takes for the event information to affect returns. In a perfectly efficient financial market, this will be a very short length of time and would include just one time period. With real world imperfections, however, there may be information leaks before the event and lags in response to the event. With information leaks, W event starts before τ = 0; if it takes time for investors to evaluate the economic consequences of an event, then W event extends into several periods after τ = 0.
The next step in evaluating the financial effect of an event is to accurately estimate expected normal returns. This requires estimation of the market model in equation 1. Under the conditions of the model, the parameters can be estimated with data from W pre using ordinary least squares (OLS). Parameter estimates (α i � and β i � ) and market data from W event are used to forecast normal returns during the event window, (R iτ |R mτ ). Thus, the abnormal return at time t is
For the classic market model,
When W event includes more than one period, sample abnormal returns are added up to obtain cumulative abnormal return, CAR iτ . If W event ranges from t = τ 1 < 0 to t = τ 2 > 0, then
This measures the total effect on abnormal returns for a multi-period event window. If the event has no effect on the value of the firm, then AR iτ (and CAR iτ ) will not be significantly different from zero, because actual returns will not significantly differ from normal returns. With a negative (positive) event, however, both AR iτ and CAR iτ will be negative (positive) and significantly different from zero. We use parametric and non-parametric tests of these hypotheses for the four Toyota events discussed above.
Following the classic market model, we can estimate CARs using alternate specifications.
In another specification, we use the Fama French 3-factor model, regressing stock returns on index of market capitalization (SMB mt ) and index of value to growth stocks (HML mt ) in addition to the S&P 500 market returns.
In yet another specification, the 3-factor model is augmented by a momentum factor (MOM mt ) on winners and losers for the market in addition to SMB mt , HML mt and R mt .
To account for risk, we also employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which uses the correlation of riskiness of a stock to the riskiness of the market to predict AR and CAR. This model uses risk free rate (the interest rate on the 1-month treasury bill) in the equation below,
Some Robustness Tests
Traditional Parametric Tests
Traditional parametric tests have been discussed in Patell, 1976; Brown and Warner, 1985; Salinger, 1992; Mackinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; McWilliams and McWilliams, 2000 . These tests generally assume that AR it is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 (AR it ). In this case,
where R � m is the mean of market returns over the estimation window. We assume that the event has an effect on the mean only and not the variance of abnormal returns during the event window. We can use the distributional properties of abnormal returns to make statistical inferences on abnormal returns for the event window. The null hypothesis is that abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero during the event window. In order to compute the test statistic for abnormal returns, we standardize each daily abnormal return
SAR iτ follows a t-distribution with T pre -2 degrees of freedom. This statistic is used to test the null hypothesis.
CAR iτ is assumed to be distributed independently and identically with mean zero and variance σ 2 (CAR iτ ). The variance of CAR on day τ is given by the following expression
Parameter k is the day within the event window. The null hypothesis is that each cumulative abnormal return is not significantly different from zero. The test statistic that is used to test the null hypothesis above is given by the following expression for standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR)
Nonparametric Rank Test
We also use a non-parametric test which dispenses with a distributional assumption for abnormal returns. This test was initially developed by Corrado (1989 Corrado ( , 2011 . It requires that we calculate abnormal returns for the event window and arrange abnormal returns in increasing order, ranking these returns from one (lowest value) to T pre (highest value). We define ζ iτ as the rank of the abnormal return for event day τ. Because ζ iτ can vary with equal probability from 1 to T pre , the statistic u iτ = ζ iτ 1+T pre follows a discrete uniform distribution. The test statistic is constructed as:
where m is the number of firms in the sample (which equals 1 here) and Z τ is close to the standard normal distribution even for small values of m. The null hypothesis is that AR for day τ is not significantly different from zero.
IV. The Data and Estimation Results
The raw data include stock prices for Toyota and the market index, measured as the Details surrounding each event are summarized in Table 3 .
[ Insert Table 3 About Here]
Dates of the estimation and event windows are presented in Table 4 . The estimation window equals 250 trading days for events 1 through 3. 8 The estimation window for the NHTSA Report (event 4) is only 230 days. 9 The starting date is March 12, 2010 in order to avoid contamination from news associated with the January recall. For example, Toyota's Chairman testified before Congress on February 24, 2010 that the problem was fixed. Thus, the beginning of this estimation window began 12 trading days after this testimony. Because each event is expected to be unanticipated, the event window begins on the event date (t = 0) and ends 10 trading days after the event.
10 Eleven day event window may be appropriate for the major recall because the dissemination of new information about the recall continued for more than a week.
We consider 11 day event windows for each event.
11 Table 5 provides summary statistics of the data for each event. During the estimation window for event 1, dividends were paid out on 8 For the major recall (event 3), we also consider an event window of 79 trading days. This avoids possible contamination from the Mark Saylor highway accident. This window starts 20 days after the accident. Whether we use a window of 250 or 79 days, the results are essentially the same. 9 In order to account for a possible change in relationship between R it and R mt due to previous events, we also used a common estimation window of 250 days which was used for the first event to predict abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for all event windows. This did not change the results. We also performed the CUSUM test of the hypothesis that there was a structural break during each estimation window. No evidence of a structural break was detected. 10 To account for possible leaks in information related to recall announcements, we also used a 21-day event window starting 10 days prior to the event day. We find no evidence of leakage of information in any of the four events. These results are presented in Appendix A.
11 Eight days may be more appropriate for the 2010 recall, because there were rumors of a Prius recall in early February (Takahashi and Kachi, 2010) .
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 About Here] OLS parameter estimates of the using data from the event window for each event are listed in Table 6 . 12 In each case, there is a positive and significant association between market returns and Toyota returns. Parameter estimates from each model are used to generate estimates of abnormal returns and of cumulative abnormal returns for 10 trading days following the event. For the Saylor highway accident (event 2), CAR reaches a value of -7 percent by day 10, but none of the CARs are statistically significant at 10 percent. Thus, in spite of the considerable publicity that this event received, Toyota's ARs and CARs were not significantly different from zero.
The major recall of 2010 (event 3) had a much greater impact, however. Two ARs (days 3 and 8) were negative and different from zero at the 1 percent level of significance. AR for day 7 was negative and significant at 5 percent level. The CARs are negative and are significantly different from zero at 1 percent for days 3 through 10. By day eight, CAR fell to 19.09 percent.
Thus, Toyota lost a substantial amount of market value, suggesting that the event was unanticipated and significant enough to cause investors to believe that this would cause a drop in expected future profits.
The NHTSA Report (event 4) also had a substantial effect on Toyota's returns. Two ARs were positive and significant at 1 percent, while one AR was positive and significant at 10 percent. Nine CARs are significant at 1 percent, and two are significant at 5 percent. CAR reached a peak of 8.7 percent on day six. This suggests that investors were reassured by the report that Toyota's previous recalls had properly corrected its accelerator pedal problem.
[Insert Tables 6 and 7 About Here]
Next, we carry out non-parametric rank test for the significance of ARs in each event.
The test produces results that are consistent with those from the parametric test and are available from the authors upon request. To test the robustness of our results, we also estimated excess returns using various multifactor models. Each specification produced the same results.
The empirical results are broadly consistent with our expectations. To visualize this, Figure 1 plots the CARS for each event during the event window. Of the three negative events (events 1-3), the major recall had the greatest negative impact on Toyota's returns. The NHTSA Report of 2011 led to substantially higher returns. This suggests that the report lifted the cloud of suspicion regarding the safety of Toyota automobiles. It also demonstrates how a government ruling in a product recall case can reduce market uncertainty and influence corporate returns.
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
V. Concluding Remarks
The damage to a company's reputation may be far greater from an event that is caused by management error than from a negative exogenous event. Investors understand that external events are outside the control of the firm and are a part of the normal course of business. On the other hand, investors are likely to punish companies more severely for management error, as it implies a deficient management team and corporate structure.
We estimate the extent to which accelerator pedal recalls affected the financial returns of the Toyota Motor Corporation. These involve a minor (floor mat) recall in 2007 and a major recall in 2010 to fix a mechanical problem with accelerator pedals on many Toyota models.
Because of lingering concerns that Toyota had not adequately fixed the problem, NHTSA continued its investigation, which culminated in a formal report in February of 2011. We also estimate the financial impact of this report on Toyota's returns.
The evidence supports three conclusions. First, the 2007 minor recall had no significant effect on Toyota's returns and illustrates that not all recalls are harmful to the firm but rather normal business. Second, the negative news event of the highway crash did not have a significant impact on share prices. Apparently it was not clear that the crash was in fact the result of design problems with the automobile. Third, the 2010 recall that involved 7.5 million vehicles and had acknowledgement from the company of a potential design flaw had a significant impact on Toyota's returns with a negative 19 percent change. Fourth, investors appear to place a high value on information that derives from unbiased experts. For Toyota, the cloud of uncertainty regarding the safety of its accelerator pedals was lifted once the NHTSA report confirmed that Toyota had corrected the problem. This confirmation had a significant and positive impact on Major Recall
